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Abstract
Wright, Anthony M.

The Impact of Guerilla Warfare on Democratic
Stability in Latin America

Throughout the history of Latin America there have been many revolutions
that have reshaped the political fabric of the entire continent. This thesis will seek to
explore the impact that the following three movements have had: The Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Las Fuerzas Armadas de la
República de Colombia (FARC), and the Tupamaros (MLN-T) in Uruguay. When
examining these three movements the research will include histories and
discussions of each revolution and text regarding the strength of democracy within
the countries. These sections will then be supported with data regarding democracy
and the people’s perspectives on democracy. The success of these movements will
be judged primarily on the strength of the democracy in the country they are based,
and additionally by the role that have played in the formation of these democratic
principles.
Research into the guerilla groups will discuss their origins, and the primary
reasons for their armed resistance to their governments. In addition, these sources
will go into detail regarding the individual movement’s histories. The data from the
censuses from source like LatinoBarómetro, and Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP) will help provide constructive polling and data on the strength of
democracy in the respective countries.
This paper will seek to examine the guerilla and political movements in a
historical and practical perspective. The beginning of the paper will examine the
iv

history of democratic and political revolutions and provide an in depth description
of the history of guerilla movements in Latin America. Then the evaluation of the
groups will provide practical examples of the impact that guerilla movements have
had on democracy within Latin America. Finishing with a discussion of the impacts
that the groups have played on democracy within their specific countries.
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Preface
Formal and Informal Political Institutions:
Latin America, a region that is unique in its political ideologies, has many
different factors that contribute to its political identity. The identity has experienced
many changes and has greatly evolved throughout the centuries following Simon
Bolivar’s campaign for independence.1 One such tenant of Latin American politics is
the idea that individual liberation movements can significantly impact governmental
institutions. Within Latin America the idea of popular resistance and the
organization of individuals to express political discontent has been commonplace
throughout Latin American history. The organizations that consist of civil society
are not formal groups and are listed as informal organizations, or popular
movements that engage many followers.
Informal organizations, which derive from informal institutions, are different
than the recognized formal governmental institutions that they seek to influence
through their actions. Informal organizations are bodies that differ from the official
government, and work in areas that are outside of official channels. Informal
institutions, in the views of Professor Gretchen Helmke, are organized nongovernmental groups within countries that have significant impacts within both the
political sphere as well as the social culture of a given nation.2 Informal
organizations however are groups that are separate and different than political
Sherwell, Guillermo Antonio. Simon Bolivar (the liberator): patriot, warrior,
statesman, father of five nations; a sketch of his life and his work. Bolivarian Society of
Venezuela, 1921. 3.
2 Helmke, Gretchen. Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin
America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006. Print.
1

1

actors that the informal institutions include. As Helmke explores with Steven
Levitsky , the difference is that informal organizations, like formal organizations, are
separate to informal institutions but each affects the other significantly.3
Informal institutions and organizations are different from recognized
institutions in that they strive to enact change through different mediums and act as
separate autonomous groups to the national institutions. These formal groups,
which include the formal rules of political institutions that run sovereign nations,
are affected by the efforts of both informal bodies. Even though they remain as
outsiders to the official political realm and the formal institutions like the judiciary,
legislative, and executive, they still impact these institutions. The informal
organizations, which are similar to the formal organizations, constitute groups of
people involved in the political process, include groups like mafias and clans.4
When further examining the definition of informal organizations there are
several similarities between informal institutions and popular movements.
The definition that Helmke and Levitsky provide for informal organizations, as seen
above, is similar to what Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig explain in their text Popular
Movements and Political Change in Mexico. In their book, they define popular
movements as organizations that have a clear social composition and use their
organization as a machine to communicate a political belief.5 These political beliefs,

Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative
politics: A research agenda." Perspectives on politics 2, no. 04 (2004): 730.
4 Helmke, "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." 732.
5 Foweraker, Joe, and Ann L. Craig. Popular movements and political change in
Mexico. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990. 13.
3
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as is the case with the informal institutions, are voiced by popular movements
directly to the government.
When examining the definitions above for formal and informal institutions,
and popular movements, most groups that voice discontent against the government
are clearly defined. However, there is another method of expressing political
discontent that hasn’t received a definition but is still a social movement. The social
movement that doesn’t have a place in these boundaries are guerilla movements,
that have been active in Latin America since the conquest of the continent. The first
occurrence of guerilla activity through indigenous populations and the Cacique
Enriquillo of the Dominican Republic who rebelled against the Spanish from 15191533.6 These movements have since proliferated and become a popular method to
express political discontent and to seek to enact change on the political institutions
throughout the continent.
Guerilla movements, as many theorists, like Helmke and Levitsky note, are
very similar and contain many attributes of informal organizations, but aren’t
categorized along with them due to their politically violent strategies.7 While they
may not belong in the category of informal organizations, they affect formal
government institutions and seek to enact political change through their actions.
Guerilla movements, like popular movements, are groups that seek to use their
social construction to impart a change on their society. As social movements, and
organizations of people who are striving to enact political change, guerilla
Castro, Daniel. Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin America.
Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. xvi.
7 Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative
politics: A research agenda." 735.
6
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movements are a successful vehicle that people use to give voice to their ideological
differences with the government.
Operating Definition for Democracy
As the ideas of setting up the definition of the different forms of institutions
is, the creation of a definition for democracy is equally as important for the context
of the paper. The definition for democracy, that I will use is the following,
We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair
competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that
allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties
and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really
govern and the military is under civilian control.8
This definition can be applied to Uruguay, and is in Colombia and El
Salvador this definition is in the process of becoming applicable to their
democratic system. Through this paper, I will contend that the guerilla
groups, have through their efforts, brought their countries if not to this
level of democracy, but closer towards the ideals listed above.
Terrorism vs. Guerilla Warfare
When examining guerilla warfare, specifically guerilla groups and their
desired transition from armed groups to political actors, it is essential to provide a
separate of the definitions for guerillas and terrorists. The two groups appear
similar in that they both use violence to obtain their desired goals being political,
ideological, or otherwise change. Yet these two groups are different and should not

Munck, Gerardo L., ed. Regimes and Democracy in Latin America : Theories and
Methods. Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK, 2007. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 9
June 2015.
8
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be considered in the same categorical definition of one another. Terrorism and
guerilla warfare are inherently different and possess ideals separate of one another.
Terrorism, unlike guerilla warfare, prays upon the weakness of noncombatants or civilian targets. This is to say that terrorist groups, like guerilla
movements or other protests groups, seek to enact a political change, whether that
be political, economic, or social, they seek to use their violent actions for this
purpose. These organizations seek to gain media attention that is garnered from
attacks on the vulnerable civilians as an aspect of the daily life to create this change.
So, an operational definition that Boaz Ganor uses to describe terrorism goes as
follows, “Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against
civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.”9 The definition
further explains that the collateral damage to citizens from an attack on a military
institution cannot be defined as terrorism, but an intentional attack on uninvolved
civilians can be considered a terrorist acts.
While this is the definition of terrorist activities, it is important to provide a
definition of guerilla warfare and what constitutes a guerilla fighter in comparison
to the provided definition for terrorism. Guerilla warfare is described as a military
tactic that is adopted by a weaker force, where the weaker force selects the place
and time of the conflict against a larger force. In addition to this the guerilla force
locates its operations in liberated areas in the countryside where the group can gain
members, resources, and create their own separate institutions. Guerilla warfare, as
Ganor, Boaz. " Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom
fighter?" Media Asia 29, no. 3 (2002): 126.
9
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Ganor’s article continues to explain, takes on the appearance of a formal conflict
between two national armies. Meaning that guerilla warfare seeks to wage its
conflict with their opposition in accordance to the conventions of standardized
warfare.10
Terrorism and guerilla warfare are two forms of non-conventional conflicts,
but besides this classification their definitions are very different from one another.
Terrorism is defined as the targeting of civilians and using action that inspire wide
ranging fear from non-combatant civilian populations, which terrorists use to enact
political change. This definition is significantly different than the military tactics of
guerilla warfare, which is an irregular and smaller form of conventional warfare,
which seeks to enact a political change on society or government. Ganor however,
examines one aspect of terrorism that will be relevant to the contents of the paper.
This topic is that of state state-sponsored terrorism, which in Latin America is a very
important concept when examining guerilla warfare and will be addressed later in
this thesis.

10

Ganor, 128.
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Chapter 1: History of Latin American Guerilla Movements
Guerilla Warfare, or as it is translated into Spanish the “little war”, was
coined as a terminology to describe the irregular and untraditional war that the
Spanish were waging against the French during their occupation in the 19th
century.11 Guerilla movements in Latin America began under a different name,
“indigenous uprisings” and the first of these was the aforementioned Enriquillo in
the Dominican Republic against the Spanish imperial forces. Enriquillo’s rebellion is
referred to as the first armed rebellion of the peoples of Latin America against an
oppressive force.12 He fought for the Taino indigenous people and as Bartolomé de
Las Casas described, was a leader of eminent ability, committed to defending the
rights of his people.13 Although he was unsuccessful in his efforts to rid the island of
the Spanish oppressors, his rebellion marked the first resistance in Latin American
from an indigenous group against their imperial oppressors.14
Enriquillo’s success would inspire an uprising two centuries later led by
another indigenous man, called Tupac Amaru II in 1780.15 The rebellion that Tupac
began was to reassert the Inca Empire in the Peruvian Andean region. Additionally,
based his desires to reassert the dominion of the Incan empire, Tupac sought to

Castro, Daniel. Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin
America. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. xvi.
12 Altman, Ida. "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish
America." The Americas. 4th ed. Vol. 63. Cambridge University Press. 587.
13 Altman, 589.
14 Altman, 614.
15 Castro, 1.
11
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rebel against the Bourbon reforms of 1776.16 These reforms saw the removal of
Creoles from governmental positions in favor of European supervisors and the
increase of taxes on different goods.17 Tupac felt that he was fighting to bring back
the Incan Empire and described himself as the descendent to the Incan Emperor.18
This insurrection became a bloody contest between Tupac’s indigenous followers
and the colonial Spaniards. Tupac’s fight would end in 1781 with his capture and
execution, which included quartering and then the burning of his remains as an
example.19
Tupac’s rebellion was a struggle for the representation of the Indigenous
nation and the Indian people of Peru before the colonialization of the Spanish
Empire. This movement sought to use war as a way to preserve their society and the
survival of their culture. The impact of the rebellion was significant and like other
rebellions, by Indian nations against colonialism, bred contempt by both groups. As
Daniel Castro notes,
The massacres of Spanish immigrants, especially of those who had
lived among the Indians, further widened the gap between the
colonizers and the colonized. Old images of imperial authority and
king had begun to dissolve.20
The rebellion was an act of protest, and the outcome may have been defeat but
Tupac and his followers expressed their discontent with the colonial power. This

Castro, Daniel. Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin
America. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. 3-4.
17 Castro, 5.
18 Castro, 6.
19 Castro, 7.
20 Castro, 8.
16
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rebellion was the act of a group of marginalized members of society using violence
as a manner of political expression.
Some 60 years after the failure of Tupac Amaru II’s rebellion in Peru there
was a peasant insurgency in the Yucatan province of Mexico near what is now the
Belize border. This insurgency, which began in 1847, was referred to as the Caste
Wars, a war that was being waged by the Yucatan province for a multitude of
reasons. The movement’s main leader, Santiago Iman, was a wealthy caudillo, or
merchant, and the movement was fighting primarily to resist taxes coming from
central Mexico, but also to try and get control over their territories.21 This
movement gave rise to the first signs of guerilla warfare within Mexico,
Only then did the rebels discover their true calling as guerilla fighters.
Retreating with their forces to the eastern rain forests, the leaders of
this conflict rallied their soldiers by instituting the religious cult of the
Speaking Cross… Supported by the unyielding commands of their
oracle, the cruzob (people of the cross) instituted a society of total
mobilization: the men divided their time between farming and
military service, while the women did household work but also
prepared the supplies for campaigns.22
The people of the Speaking Cross were successful in their uprising and became a
separate autonomous region within Mexico. Although this autonomous body would
dissolve and splinter after a half-century or so, their victory was a huge milestone.
The method through which the Speaking Cross attained their success marked the
successful introduction of guerilla warfare and rural insurgency to Central America.

21
22

Castro, 14.
Castro, 15.
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Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican Revolution:
Emiliano Zapata, a rural leader, who was born into the Mexican state of
Morelos, was a revolutionary through and through. In 1909, he was elected by his
village to be a President of the defense committee.23 His requests to the government,
as the president of the committee, were not met, and Zapata’s response was to
peacefully occupy the lands that the government would not relinquish back to the
people of the village. In the year 1910, Francisco Madero initiated a revolution
against President Porfirio Díaz on the grounds of reflective suffrage and no
reelection. Zapata respected this insurrection due to the movements Plan of San
Luís.24 The Plan of San Luís was a political manifesto that sought to redistribute land
to smaller owners, which had been illegally stolen. With these San Luís goals in
mind, Zapata contacted Madero and asked to become part of the movement, and by
doing so brought revolution to state of Morelos.25
Following several swift conflicts the revolutionaries succeeded in their
uprising against the government in 1911.26 This victory against the Díaz
dictatorship was in name only, and the revolutionaries had to deal with the federal
combatants remaining active in the countryside. Their differences reached a boiling
point due to Madero, who became president elect and rejected all of Zapata’s
demands for land reform. Following the open rejection of Zapata’s demands Madero

Castro, 24.
Castro, 25.
25 Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986. 310.
26 Castro, 25.
23
24
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endorsed a military campaign, led by Victoriano Huerta, against the Zapatistas.27
Zapata and his followers resisted the efforts of the federal forces in the Morelos
region. Upon assuming office, Madero moved away from agricultural reform and
sought to enact more elite focused political change. Due to his political ineptitude
and how he turned on his allies like Zapatista upon assuming office, he was easily
ousted by a Huerta backed military coup in 1913 and was executed that same year.28
By the year 1914 the Zapatistas and the followers of Pancho Villa and
Venustiano Carranza had successfully defeated the federal forces of the Huerta coup
and took control of Mexico once again.29 This control, similarly to the last period of
governance, was marred by political strife. This strife was mostly focused on the
ideological differences between Carranza and Zapata regarding agrarian reform.30
Carranza believed that the government could not address the issue of agrarian
reform and went so far as to say that the re-appropriation of lands was illegal for the
government to perform.
For the following four years the Zapatistas waged war against the
Carrancistas pushing the government follow through on it’s promised land
reforms.31 The Zapatistas however faced a very difficult struggle in this sense
because the Carrancistas were better armed and had better access to supplies. This
however did not stop Zapata and his followers, who, through textbook guerilla

Castro, 26.
Castro, 28
29 Castro, 29
30 Castro, 31-33
31 Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Vol.1, 1986. 317.
27
28
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warfare methods, fought the superior Carrancista forces.32 While the efforts of the
Zapatistas were being rewarded with success on April 10, 1919 the movement
suffered a crippling loss. While riding to negotiate with an officer of the Carrancistas
who was claimed to be defecting, Zapata was shot dead, leaving the movement
without it’s leader and forcing it to the margins of Mexican political scene.33
In 1920 Carranza met the same fate, as he was killed by Álvaro Obregón’s
forces, who became president of Mexico until 1924.34 Zapata had been killed, but he
remained the embodiment of the Zapatista armed resistance movement in Mexican
history seeking to use its influence to enact social change. Zapata’s influence as a
guerilla fighter and charismatic leader, who represented the desires of the peasants
and farmers of Mexico for agrarian reform, became one of the revolution’s most
defining features. Through his efforts and the efforts of the Mexican Revolution the
idea that guerilla movements could experience not only minor success but also
overthrown entire governments became real. The Zapatistas left a lasting mark on
Mexican social movements, and that mark can still be seen today.
Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán and the 26th of July Movement:
Colonel Árbenz, who led the October Revolution in 1944, which overthrew
the military dictator Jorge Ubico, successfully reinstating democratic elections and
rule to Guatemala.35 Upon his ascendency to the presidency he attempted to bring
about social reforms that revolved around assisting the impoverished and enacting
more land reforms. His efforts, and the efforts of his government however weren’t
Knight, Alan The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 2. 362
Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 2. 1986. 367.
34Castro, 40
35 Gott, Richard. Guerrilla movements in Latin America. London: Nelson, 1970. 5.
32
33
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enough to aid the poor and were considered too drastic to avoid the attention of the
United Fruit Company, who felt their wealth and financial security being
endangered by a “socialist”. The attention that the Árbenz government attracted for
itself was from the U.S. on behalf of their United States industries heavily involved
within Guatemala.
The resulting statement from the U.S. State Department, regarding
Guatemala at the time, was that they were disappointed in the country’s voting
within the Organization of American States, Rio Defense Pact. Additionally, the U.S.
was alarmed that Guatemala was purchasing guns from Eastern European nations,
to protect itself from different internal and international threats.36 The reality was
much different, according to Richard Gott, author of the Guerilla Movements in Latin
America. The issue involved the Guatemalan government’s distribution of fallow
lands belonging to the United Fruit Company, and Árbenz’s “soft” stance against
communism.37 These realities led to the overthrow of the democratically elected
government of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán by a military coup, led by Carlos Castillo
Armas, which was backed by the CIA.38
The importance of this event to future guerilla movements is important as
the initial response to this overthrow was that even if guerilla movements and
political uprising occur, there is the ever constant threat of the U.S. intervention. The
other concern for revolutionaries, as Gott notes is that unless the revolution goes all
the way and shuts down the wealthy ruling class and suppress the governmental
Gott, 5.
Gott, 5-6.
38 Gott, 3.
36
37
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structure within the nation, there is the threat of U.S. intervention will always be
present. At the time of the military coup, President Árbenz had been advised by a
future revolutionary, who suggested that he fight against the coup for the rights he
desired for the people of Guatemala. This guerilla fighter wanted him to arm the
peasants and workers to fight the imperial threat posed by the U.S. backed
Guatemalan Carlos Armas, this advice came from none other than Ernesto Che
Guevara.39
While a popular rebellion in Guatemala took place later in 1960 and was led
by two army officers, Luis Turcios and Marco Yon, its influence on Latin America
cannot be understated.40 While the overthrow of the Árbenz government took place
in 1954 as was previously mentioned, it was an event that inspired Che Guevara, an
advisor to President Árbenz, to continue fighting for justice in other countries. Upon
the overturn of the Árbenz government Guevara had to flee to Mexico and living off
the streets of Mexico City.41 Che was in luck however, because Mexico City was a
refugee for other budding revolutionaries, most specifically Cubans who fled from
the Fulgencio Batista regime. It was during this time that Che met with Fidel and
Raúl Castro and joined the revolutionary movement that would alter the modern
history of Latin American history, the 26th of July movement.42
The 26th of July Movement, began as a small group of freedom fighters who
met and trained in Mexico, seeking to end the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship in Cuba.
Gott, 6
Gott, 20
41 Ross, John. "Che’s Mexican Legacy." Www.counterpunch.org. February 26, 2016.
Accessed January 20, 2017. http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/10/19/che-smexican-legacy/.
42 Ross, 2
39
40
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The movement acquired its name from the unsuccessful assault on the Moncada
barracks in Santiago de Cuba, led by the Castro’s on the 26th of July 1953.43 The
survivors of the Moncada attack and others travelled in the Granma, a leaky and
unstable yacht that Fidel Castro, the leader of the movement, had acquired their
return to Cuba. On December 2nd of 1956 the small detachment landed in Cuba and
were immediately ambushed.44 Following this crushing blow the surviving members
of the group fled to the Sierra Maestra, a heavily wooded mountain area to recover
and plan their next course of action. From their mountainous position, they
coordinated with their clandestine urban cohort in Santiago de Cuba to plan minor
battles to raise the confidence and support for the movement in the Sierra
Maestra.45
Following series of minor victories, they took full advantage of media
coverage from the New York Times46 to grow in size as their skirmishes grew as
well. These small victories solidified the movement and their purpose to eliminate
the Batista regime from power. In the spring of 1958, following many victories from
the small band of guerillas, the Cuban people began supporting the movement.47
Following the development of a unified front, which included the Auténticos,
Ortodoxo party, the Directorio Revolucionario, and the Montecristi movement the
revolution pressed on to remove the Batista regime.48 This final press became the
Goldenberg, Boris. The Cuban revolution and Latin America. New York: Praeger,
1965. 153-154
44 Goldenberg, 155
45 Goldenberg, 155
46 Goldenberg, 156
47 Goldenberg, 159
48 Goldenberg, 161
43
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final offensive in December of 1958 and with it the Batista fled the country and the
infrastructure collapsed. In January of 1959 Fidel Castro and the 26th of July
movement toppled the Batista regime and took control of Cuba.49
Upon seizing power in Cuba, the movement immediately enacted changes to
the policies that had suppressed the country under Batista’s regime. The
revolutionary government sought to champion social revolution, which would
include agrarian reformations, literacy reforms, the nationalization of important
Cuban industries, and the desire to promote an industrial Cuban economy.50 The
influence of the Soviet Union on these policies, and their Marxist ideologies is a
point of great importance to the origin of guerilla movements, especially during the
Cold War.
The Red Scare and U.S. Intervention:
The U.S. policy towards Latin America, in context of the feared spread of
Marxist and leftist beliefs, is another component that is crucial to understanding
guerilla warfare in Latin America, and the purpose of their struggles. The
development of these policies began following World War II and the development of
the Soviet Union as a political rival to the U.S. following the collapse of the Axis
Alliance. The predominant theory that would initiate this interaction would be the
development theory, which sought to increase the interaction and financial aid that
the U.S. provided Latin American. Development theory operated on the pretext of
supporting the economic growth of “third” world countries, but this idealism was
Goldenberg, 163
Wright, Thomas C. Latin America in the era of the Cuban Revolution. New York:
Praeger, 1991.
49
50
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merely a cover for full blown U.S. intervention throughout the entire region against
Latin American governments51.
The intervention of the U.S. in Latin America throughout the 20th century
should not however be viewed as an operation to assist local governments develop
more complete economies, but rather as a political action reacting to the perceived
communist threat. The most notable of these interactions were the removal of
Salvador Allende in Chile and the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, but the U.S.
involvement went deeper than these two incidents.52 The actions of the U.S.
government were not in response to any direct threat from the countries in question
or even from Russia using the countries as a base of operations. The U.S. was acting
in defense of a national image of strengthen against the perceived threat of the
spread of Communism throughout the world.
Their actions in Latin America, as Grow’s text explains, were a show of
international strength to deter the soviets,
… U.S. leaders worried that failure on their part to maintain firm
hegemonic control over the United States’ traditional sphere of
influence in the Western Hemisphere…would be interpreted by other
governments as an indication of U.S. weakness, a sign perhaps that the
United States no longer had the capability, or the will, to project its
power in defense of interests.53
The U.S. therefore had to pursue these hardline policies, due in large part to the
advice from Henry Kissinger, who served as Secretary of State and National Security
Hunt, Michael H. Ideology and U.S. foreign policy. New Haven: Yale University
press, 1987. 159-160
52 Grow, Michael. U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: pursuing regime
change in the cold war. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2012. 186-187.
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advisor for Presidents Nixon and Ford, as well as unofficial advisor to many
leaders.54 Kissinger would continue on to clarify this idea even further with his own
doctrine, the Kissinger Commission of 1984, where he stated that “the triumph of
hostile forces in what the Soviets call the ‘strategic rear’ of the United States would
read as a sign of U.S. impotence”.55 With all of this taken into account the U.S. foreign
policy into the Latin American region reflected a very militant, and non-supportive
stance towards leftist, democratic governments that were perceived as communist
friendly governments.
Conclusion:
The importance of the Cuban Revolution was that the imperial efforts of the
United States within Latin America had been successfully challenged. Cuba was a
nation that had thrown of the shackles of the imperialism and had done so through
an armed conflict led by the 26th of July movement and its leaders Che Guevara and
Fidel Castro. In the following decades, the Cuban nation would face great difficulties
and punishment from the United States for the success of the revolution. Yet, no
matter how severe U.S. policy in Cuba was, the revolutionary government would not
cave in, and constantly strove to live up to the ideals that they waged the revolution
to institute.
Latin American countries would view the Cuban Revolution with a sense of
pride and unity. Throughout the Latin American, the U.S. backed dictatorships and
false democracies had reigned uncontested. Cuba, and its revolution would inspire
not only leftist throughout Latin America but would serve as an inspiration for
54
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social movements globally. The revolution was unique because it was a guerilla
movement that achieved its goal and became a sovereign nation, free of dictatorship.
Through their success, they inspired many other guerilla movements throughout
Latin America to form and resist their oppressive governments.
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Chapter Two: The Tupamaros and Uruguay
History of the Tupamaros:
In 1971, a group known as the Frente Amplio (FA), or the Broad Front in
Uruguay came into existence. The Frente Amplio represented a democratic coalition
of around 12 fractured leftist political parties. The movement really began to gain
traction in the early 1970’s but swiftly lost a lot of popular support because of the
terrorist tactics that they were employing. The Tupamaros (Movimiento de
Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros) were not like other guerilla movements; they were
more of a political movement that decided to take up arms as their method of
protest. They wanted to move the country away from an authoritarian dictatorship
and help save the workers from market capitalism. However, with the 1973 military
coup d’état, most democratic rights guaranteed in the 1967 Uruguayan constitution
were not respected, leading effectively to the death of the FA after little over a
decade in existence.56
The Tupamaros officially began organizing in late 1962 into early 1963, and
were led during their initial formation by Raúl Sendric and other disgruntled
members of the Socialist party.57 The name for the movement is widely believed to
have been taken from the revolution of Tupac Amaru against the Spanish Empire in
1572.58 In Martin Weinstein’s book he addresses the overall structure of Uruguayan
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democracy, specifically drawing attention to the lack of representation that the
Tupamaros had in government. Weinstein quotes the MLN-T’s first public statement
to the nation in 1967,
For these reasons, we have placed ourselves outside the law. This the
only honest action when the law is not equal for all; when the law
exists to defend the spurious interests of a minority in detriment to
the majority; when the law works against the country’s progress;
when even those who have created it place themselves outside of it,
with impunity, whenever it is convenient for them.59
The quote continues to introduce the movement and announce the beginning of the
Tupamaros guerrilla warfare to fighting the dictatorship. The movement came out
with this charged statement to show that they felt it necessary to create an armed
rebellion to fight for their rights. The desire of the movement to promote the
economic well-being and political stability of the country would motivate the group
to wage an armed guerilla war against the Uruguayan government for many years.
The Tupamaros, unlike other guerilla movements in the past decade, such as
the Cuban Revolution, sought to become an urban guerilla fighting group. This idea
of urban resistance went completely against the mold of guerilla fighting at the time,
as created by Che Guevara through his own book, Che Guevara Guerrilla Warfare,
which he wrote following the Cuban revolution. In his Guevara’s book on Guerilla
Warfare, he discusses three major components to irregular warfare, the third of
which was the necessity to have a countryside base of operations to concentrate the
development of your forces.60 The Tupamaros however did not feel that Uruguay
was the environment for a rural-based revolution, as was the case in the Cuban
59
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Revolution, which relied on mountains, trees, and rallying the peasants, and rural
citizens. The Tupamaros saw an opportunity in Uruguay to develop an urban
resistance in Montevideo and began an urban guerilla war against the dictatorship.
They felt that this method would be very successful due to the design of
Montevideo, and the greater metropolitan area of the city. In Daniel Castro’s book,
he cites an anonymous interview with a Tupamaro fighter, where the fighter
addressed questions regarding the strategies, policies and beliefs of the group. One
such question addressed the idea of the urban revolution in Uruguay,
Q: And for the urban struggle, do the conditions exist?
A: Montevideo is a city sufficiently large and polarized by social
struggles to give cover to the vast active commando contingent. It
constitutes a far better framework than that which other
revolutionary movements have had for the urban struggle.61
The Tupamaros underwent a military campaign that sought to unite other social
movements, labor unions, and the impoverished Uruguayans who the desperate
economic situation most significantly affected.62 The urban guerillas, however, did
not achieve their goal of bringing down the government, and following the capture
of several important leaders in 1972, the movement collapsed entirely.63 Following
the defeat of the Tupamaros the government of Uruguay took an even more
oppressive which led to the prolonged imprisonment and torture of captured
Tupamaros.
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American Intervention in Uruguay
U.S intervention throughout Latin America has been a prolific and dramatic
occurrence and Uruguay was no exception during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Uruguay,
widely referred to as the Switzerland of the South American nations due to its
history of social democracy and peaceful society had been violence free since 1848.
This period of peace was destined to fall however because of U.S. interests in
hemispheric hegemony and their intervention policies that supports this
dictatorship.64
The initial intervention from the U.S. in Uruguay took place in the Uruguayan
police force throughout the nation. The U.S. Office of Public Safety (OPS) began
training police officers in Uruguay and additionally hundreds of officers were
encouraged by the OPS to travel to the International Police Academy and the U.S.
Army School of the Americas in Panama to gain further U.S. training. The OPS,
which had functioned in other “struggling” democracies like Vietnam, had gained a
negative reputation for its aggressive torture techniques. While the OPS were
supposed to maintain an advisory role to the Uruguayan police force, in 1966 under
the leadership of William Cantrell, the head of the program at the time and a covert
CIA officer, moved to marginalize the police forces.
This marginalization took the form of the National Directorate of Information
and Intelligence (DNII), which was Cantrell’s organization that replaced the
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Uruguayan led department of Alejandro Otero.65 Otero was the head of the
Uruguayan police force and in 1966, with the successful marginalization of Otero
and the anti-torture Uruguayan police force, Cantrell began torturing political
prisoners. With the flood gates of torture opened in Uruguay the OPS brought in Dan
Mitrione, who was an advisor on Latin America to the CIA, to lead the Public safety
office in Montevideo and train the officers. Mitrione had been heavily active in the
South American police forces, and previously had trained the Brazilian police forces
in interrogation and torture methods before arriving in Uruguay.
Under Mitrione the cases of torture increased and in an interview in 1970
Ortero publicly denounced Mitrione’s methods and noted his scientific and
psychological torture methods. One Cuban operative within the CIA, Manuel Hevia
Conculluela, describe one of Mitrione’s methods in his book Pasaporte 11333, Eight
Years With the C.I.A.66 In it Conculluela described a sound proofed room, where
Mitrione and his men performed different demonstrations of torture methods, using
electric currents and chemical substances on four homeless beggars.67 In addition to
the U.S. sponsored police brutality and torture methods, U.S. intervention took on
another form, which was the development and support of death squadrons.
In a declassified telegram from 1971, the U.S. ambassador to Uruguay,
Charles Adair, discussed the existence of death squads with important Uruguayan
Ministers of the Interior. The following quote acknowledges that not only did the
Uruguayan government know these squads existed, but that both governments
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endorsed their existence, "Re counterterrorism, particularly formation of 'death
squads' as tactic, I said I would not presume to pass judgment on developments in
Uruguay ..."68 The ambassador would later add that he told the officials that such
tactics weren’t effective, but did not recant the statement he had made regarding
death squads. Both the U.S. and Uruguay have admitted that the death squads
existed and that they were an active component of counterinsurgency efforts in
Uruguay.69
The existence of death squads became even more apparent when, in 1972,
the Tupamaros kidnapped and questioned Nelson Bardesio, who had been OPS
director Cantrell’s driver. In their line of questioning, which Bardesio acknowledged
was without violence, he revealed that the death squads were prevalent throughout
the Uruguayan police force and the DNII. He gave the Tupamaros the names of
officers Hugo Campos Hermida, Victor Castiglioni, and admitted to his own
involvement in the squads. The other two officers he indicated were important
members of the DNII. Castiglioni was the director of intelligence for the DNII and
Hermida was in charge of investigations for the DNII. Bardesio also revealed that
these death squads were responsible for assassinations and bomb attacks against
socialist and communist leaders.70
These two examples of U.S. intervention, coupled with the idea of the U.S.’s
desire for hemispheric control, led to the manipulation of the Uruguayan elections.
This interference, which was spearheaded by President Richard Nixon and his
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National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, encouraged the Brazilian and Argentine
militaries to take an active role in sabotaging the Frente Amplio political coalition. In
a meeting between Kissinger and Brazilian dictator Emílio Médici, Kissinger
commented on the status of the left in Uruguay and Bolivia, "in areas of mutual
concern such as the situations in Uruguay and Bolivia, close cooperation and parallel
approaches can be very helpful for our common objectives."71 This support, and the
effective destruction of the left by the army and police forces in Uruguay, led the
country to take a dramatic turn, which was led by the military seizing power in
1973.
Military Dictatorship:
In 1973 a group of Uruguayan generals and president Juan María Bordaberry,
a civilian who assisted the military junta against the government, established his
own dictatorship in Uruguay. Once the dictatorship was in place the government
began a hardline approach against the rising left and Tupamaros. This military
regime brutally suppressed the left and kidnapped, tortured, and killed many of the
leaders of the left and the Tupamaros. After capturing Tupamaros leaders during the
rebellion, they imprisoned them and began torturing them and exacting their
revenge. One of these leaders was José Mujica, who was considered a high value
prisoner and was never kept in one prison for longer than six months because of his
ability to rally the prisoners and the importance he held for the Tupamaros.
José Mujica, one of the leaders of the MLN-T, was abducted by military forces
while roaming the Uruguayan countryside and was brought into the military’s
71
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interrogation facilities. During his initial capture in 1972 he was tortured in
captivity for information regarding the Tupamaros and their leadership structure.
This torture included a particularly awful method of using an electric prod on his
naked body, which led to a permanent change in Mujica’s incontinence and severe
mental trauma. Upon receiving what information they desired from Mujica, he was
released to partake in the negotiations with the government and the remaining
MLN-T fighters. These negotiations, which were held in undisclosed locations
involving the surrender of the Tupamaros fighters, and the government used former
members, like Mujica, to negotiate with the fighters.72
With the collapse of the civilian government in 1973 Mujica’s life as a
political prisoner changed. For the following twelve years, he and several other
leaders of the MLN-T would be transferred around to different military facilities.73
This was necessary because the dictatorship chose different military facilities so
that they could keep all the Tupamaros separate. In these separate and isolated
locations, they would commit egregious human rights violations to them during
their captivity. These violations, which Mujica lists thoroughly, fundamentally broke
him down mentally and would stay with Mujica long after his captivity.
Mujica was held with a certain group of Tupamaros, the others being
Eleuterio Fernández, and Mauricio Rosencof. The three each experienced similar
conditions during they’re captivity. Mujica’s conditions included not being allowed
to bath for two years, water boarding, physical abuse, hallucinations due to guards
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watching him, and solitary confinement.74 During his time as a prisoner Mujica
spent over 4,000 days in these kinds of living conditions with no hope of release and
no news from the outside world.75
At the same time the dictatorship was facing a struggle to maintain its
repressive techniques and control over the Uruguayan populace. During the 1980’s
there was a resurgence in politicians from the formerly banned leftist groups who
desired to bring about a change in Uruguay. In response to the rise of these new
politicians in 1980, the military regime under Aparicio Méndez sought to entrench
themselves, and their authoritarian regime, with a new constitution. This tactic
failed and encouraged the exiled and repressed political leaders to seek to the end
the regime. This change came about in 1984 through the Naval Club Pact, which
established the conditions for the transition back to civilian rule and the end of 12
years of dictatorship.76
Restored Democracy and the integration of the MLN-T
Once democracy was restored in 1985 under President Julio Sanguinetti, the
FA came back as a strong coalition and served as a sign for the future of democracy
in Uruguay.77 This included the reintegration of the MLN-T into political society. The
MLN-T has seen many of its leaders in political office, but none more prevalent then
José Mujica. Mujica was elected president in 2009, and was one of the most active
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he and the leaders of the Tupamaros decided to forgo guerilla warfare and enter
politics. Shirley Christian, of the New York Times, below illustrates former president
Mujica’s description of the internal review that the MLN-T underwent before joining
the FA.78
Mr. Mujica also acknowledged that the Tupamaros are going through
an ''internal reorganization'' that reflects the varied experiences of the
members during the past dozen years as well as what he termed ''the
crisis all over the world in the traditional thinking of the left”.79
This moment in the formation of the FA is impressive due to his incredible patience
to suspend their push for the immediate creation of an active party in the political
structure. This patience allowed the Tupamaros to achieve a better understanding
of themselves and the world. The leaders of the movement knew that they had to
first understand themselves before they could try and change Uruguay.
In Christian’s 1986 New York Times article she describes the influence of
other worldly movements and how the leaders of the MLN-T sought to use these
events to help their cause and solidify their political party,
Some Tupamaros, he said, have returned from exile in Western
Europe, where they were influenced by social democratic thinking.
Others are marked by the long years of prison isolation. Still others, he
said, are returning to Uruguay from Central America, where they were
influenced by the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas, both of
whom believe in leadership by an all-powerful revolutionary
vanguard.80
With different perspectives in mind the MLN-T formed their own political party
called the called the Movement of Popular Participation (MPP), which joined the FA
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in 1988 and is currently the largest single faction within the FA.81 The MPP and the
MLN-T wanted to fully endorse the socialist movement and create a party that
would embody what the Cuban Revolution and other revolutionary movements in
Central America had fought to achieve. They didn’t want to continue the violence of
the past, but instead to have their goals represented through an open and
democratic political process.
The MPP political party took in several different aspects not only regarding
themselves, but also of the world around them. In 1995, the Progressive Encounter
and the Nuevo Espacio coalitions joined the FA and they began to compete on the
national stage as a serious political movement. In the 2004, national elections the
party pulled off a major upset against the traditional parties like the dominant
Colorado party (PC) and the Blanco parties (PB).82 They were able to come away
with 17 out of the 31 senate seats, 52 out of the 99 in the chamber of deputies and
won the presidency behind Tabaré Vázquez.83
The results of this election helped cement the FA as a major political group.
The FA was able to represent the far left, and it encompassed both the poor and the
conservative populations that sought to bring back import industrial substitution
(ISI) which endorsed the usage of foreign made goods to substitute national
industry.84 It was a broad movement that helped people feel that they were truly
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being represented. With the successful presidential election of Tabaré Vázquez and
the FA congressional majority in 2006, the coalition solidified its presence on the
national stage and showed the huge progress that it had made since its formation.
The FA’s success represented the national acceptance of a solidified left. This
success would lead to the election of José Mujica to the presidency.85
The largest issue that the MPP and the FA currently face is that the majority
of their political leaders are advancing in age and there appears to be no younger
generation of leaders to fill the void. Christian’s New York Times article accurately
shows however that this is not the first time that these issues have been
encountered,
… Despite the graying image of the leadership, more than half of the
current Tupamaros militants are less than 25 years old. An open
convention called by the Tupamaros last December attracted about
1,000 people, thought to constitute the total number of members and
serious sympathizers.86
The party has had problems gaining younger leaders and the older leaders like
LatinoBarómetro, which is a poll that gathers the opinion of citizens throughout
Latin America on issues regarding social norms, economic issues, and politics.
LatinoBarómetro provides data illustrating the success of the party over the recent
years and has shown that there has been a serious spike in the popularity of the
party since its formation.
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LatinoBarómetro data supporting the FA:
In 2004 LatinoBarómetro survey posed the question to a sample of
Uruguayans what party they would vote for if the election were this Sunday. The
data that came back didn’t favor the political system, 64.6% of the population felt
that they wouldn’t vote while another 20.1% of the population felt that they didn’t
even know whom they would vote for. These numbers are staggering because they
represent a population that had lost faith in the democratic process. The numbers
however changed drastically and in the most recent 2013 opinion polls 41.8% said
that they would vote for the FA candidate. This number has gone up since 2001
when the FA and the Encuentro Progresista (EP) claimed 34.6% of the entire
population’s vote.
LatinoBarómetro data tables regarding Uruguay’s democratic transformation
from 1995 to 2013 are interesting. The data shows an impressive national swing
towards the left. In 1995, the total percentage of the Uruguayan population who
claimed to be leftist was around .2% of the total populace with around 11.7% of the
country claiming to be right wing. So the data is showing a country that was typical
for its time and a political system that favored right wing and conservative policies.
However in 2013 the most recent LatinoBarómetro surveys have shown a huge
swing to the left. In 2013 about 11.3% of the Uruguayan population oriented
themselves with the left wing. This is a huge change in the national percentage that
considers themselves to be leftist. This national switch in many ways is a result of
the Frente Amplio and the influence of their political coalition.
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In 1995 the LatinoBarómetro polled how satisfied people were with
democracy in Uruguay and only .5% of the population claimed that they were very
satisfied with democracy in Uruguay. This poll was taken again in 2013 regarding
satisfaction with democracy and 70.9% of the population now claim to be very
satisfied with democracy. This poll is reveals of the significance of the FA because as
the total amount of people who support the FA has increased so has the increased
satisfaction with democracy. The MPP and the FA have been influential in Uruguay
allowing the country to feel that democracy is being valued and that it is something
important to their country. The FA has helped increase the strength of democracy in
Uruguay and through these different statistics the correlation between the FA and
overall trend of democratic stability in Uruguay is clear. The FA and the MPP have
helped democracy solidify and they have helped people feel that democracy is
possible.
Conclusion:
In the most recent publication of Latinobarometro’s data in 2015 the idea of
Uruguay maintaining a strong democracy was supported. In the 2015 data tables
75.8% of all of those polled responded that democracy was the best governing
option, with 11.1% claiming that the manner of governing didn’t concern them. This
data confirms that democracy is still an active part of Uruguayan culture and the
efforts of the FA have been paying off. In addition to these data points reflecting the
national support for democracy is overall happiness regarding the actions of the
parliament and national congress. The data that came back from Uruguay regarding
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this satisfaction reflects very well on the institutions, with 5.6% of those polled
saying that they are doing very well and 57% saying they have done a good job.
In addition to these data points Latinobarometro includes the survey
regarding the particular party that voters would back if they had to vote this
Sunday. In these polls 49.8% of those polled felt that they would vote for the FA, the
closest group to the FA was the PN (Partido Nacional) with 7.8%. In additional
polling Latinobarometro asked voters how strongly they support this party and
35% answered strongly while 50.5% answered quite strongly. The Uruguayan
political landscape has changed dramatically since the 1970’s dictatorship and,
based on the efforts of the FA and the Tupamaros, the revolutionary ideals that the
movement cherished have flourished and developed into a strong democracy.
Uruguay is currently one of the most stable democracies in all of Latin
America. This is in large part because of the contributions and hard work of the
Tupamaros for democracy. The Tupamaros began as a movement that tried to fill
the holes that democracy was unable to fill. They then became part of the
government as a formal political party and ceased their guerilla activities. For these
reasons, I think it is fair to say that they were an informal organization, that became
an informal party and finally became an official movement. This transition from
informal to a formal movement through the formation of the MPP and the FA is a
testament to the desire of the Tupamaros to strengthen democracy in Uruguay.
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Chapter Three: The FARC, UP, and Colombia
History of the FARC:
In order to understand the formation of the FARC, or Las Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarios de Colombia it is necessary to explain the impact of an event called
la violencia. La violencia was a nine year period, between 1948-1957, where state
violence was `waged between the liberal and conservative parties within Colombia,
which resulted in a high amount of civilian deaths. La violencia began with the
assassination of the liberal political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, which many
liberal leaders credited to the conservative party. Gaitán, who was meant to be the
liberal’s presidential candidate, led the way for the conservative, Laureano Gómez to
win the next presidential race in the 1950.87
Gómez’s victory, and the continued control of the conservative party in the
countryside, greatly contributed to the formation of liberal guerilla squads, which
were organized to combat conservative party’s control in rural villages and farms.
Gómez would lose the faith of both the conservative party and the military, and was
deposed by a military coup d’état, which led General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to
presidency in 1953. During Pinilla’s presidency, he sought to end the political
insurgency throughout the countryside by adopting a hardline approach using
violent suppression methods. Pinilla remained in power until 1957, at which time
the liberal and conservative parties united to form the National Front. The National
Front reached an agreement that they would alternate who would win the
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presidency lasting until 1974. This agreement began with the election of the liberal
Alberto Camargo to the presidency in 1958.88
Under the leadership of Camargo, the Colombian government sought to
combat the damage that la violencia had brought to the Colombian people. By the
time that Camargo had come to power approximately 200,000 people had died
during the nine year period of the violence. Carmargo sought to end la violencia by
putting different policies into place that would lift the rural communities out of
poverty. These policies, included plans to redistribute lands to small planters,
construct schools, health clinics, water and sewage systems, roads, and community
centers. The program faced many problems, which included a lack of funds and a
slow pace of land redistribution, that greatly affected their effectiveness in the
countryside. The reforms also couldn’t address the high rates of urban
unemployment and the lack of low income housing in urban areas, which created
tension throughout the country.89
This tension unified the dissenting liberal guerilla groups, that had
previously remained in isolated and separate jungle pockets during the 1950’s.
These guerilla groups, which would eventually form the FARC movement, began as
the Southern Guerilla Bloc. The Southern Guerilla Bloc, which developed throughout
southern federal administrative sections, developed a strong relationship with the
Colombian Communist Party (CCP). This relationship was extremely beneficial for
the Southern Guerilla Bloc, who received financial support from the party as well as
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political direction for the movement. The connection the CCP and the support the
party had from Russia, gave the Southern Guerilla Bloc much needed resources and
confidence to emerge as a national guerilla movement. With the formation of the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) in 1964, Moscow released a
statement regarding U.S. imperialism and how the U.S. had military bases in
Colombia calling for workers and peasants to support the guerillas.90
Development of the FARC:
The U.S. and Colombia, during the rise of the FARC, had good intergovernmental relations, and Colombia was one of the U.S.’s strongest allies in the
region. During the Cold War Colombia had openly supported U.S. anticommunism,
and President George W. Bush stated that Colombia was the U.S.’s strongest ally in
Latin America. Colombia had sent soldiers to Korea during the Korean war in the
1950’s and motioned to expel Cuba from the OAS at the 1961 conference following
the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Additionally, and most relevant to combating the
FARC and other insurgency groups within the country, during the 1960’s Colombia
adopted the national security doctrine promoted by the United States. The
Colombian government had agreed upon an intelligence sharing plan, which allowed
the U.S. to place military officials in the Bogota embassy as advisors to the
government.91 With Colombia’s close, and supportive relations to the U.S. in mind,
the formation of the FARC, a communist group that had the support of the CCP with
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support from the Soviet Union, represented a grave threat to the U.S. and the
Colombia government.
The FARC formally created their name in 1966, declaring their status as a
communist armed guerilla movement within Colombia, which triggered the U.S.
fears of the spread of communism within Latin America. The beginning of the U.S.
intervention against the FARC was through Plan Laso, which was a U.S. led
counterinsurgency effort that overlapped with Colombian efforts to combat
guerillas. The implementation of these policies were quite severe on the FARC, with
the movement seeing a loss of 70 percent of its armaments and a significant amount
of their soldiers between 1966 and 1968. Even with these efforts however the FARC
would survive and grow to 1,000 soldiers by 1978.92 Although the FARC’s forces
grew during this period, they had been pushed deep into the jungle regions of
Guaviara, Caquetá, and Putumayo. These regions would eventually serve as the basis
for the development of their economic role in narcotrafficking.93
The 1980’s represented a bright future for the FARC and for their
development. With the success of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, the FARC,
as well as other guerilla movements throughout Latin America, felt empowered.
This empowerment for the FARC represented the development of a different
approach, that would venture away from the Cuban hit and run style, into a more
direct and frontal assault style. This represented the development of 48 different
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military fronts, with an increased presence in urban areas, and improved
communication amongst the guerillas. These developments would greatly assist the
FARC in opening negotiations with the Colombian government to further advance
their cause, not as guerillas but as a political movement.94
The UP:
In 1985, the Colombian government signed an agreement to “ensure
political security and equality for the UP (Union Patriotica)”95 This was an empty
promise, however, as the government eventually did not honor this agreement.
Several different non-governmental organizations, with encouragement from the
government, were the major perpetrators responsible for subsequent deaths of
members of the UP. The paramilitaries, drug lords, and the Colombian army all
lined up against the UP and their officials for different reasons. The issue came to
a head when in 1987 a young fourteen year old boy, who was directly related to a
Medellin drug cartel, assassinated Jaime Pardo, the 1986 UP presidential
candidate and party figure head, leading to the FARC abandoning the UP and
returning to Guerilla warfare.96
The official death count of members of the UP is around 3,000 but many
believe that number to be closer to 5,000. The UP represented an opportunity for
the federal government to put aside their grievances with the guerillas and allow
them to reintegrate into normal life. The government however didn’t want to
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provide the FARC or other guerilla movements the opportunity to seek political
representation for fear of losing control over political landscape. The Álvaro
Uribe administration then deemed it necessary to exterminate the UP because
they were acting as a cover for the FARC to solidify their position in Colombia.
The violence levied against the UP and their supporters was so drastic that in
1987 the FARC saw themselves forced to renounce the UP party returning to
armed struggle against the Colombian government.97
The UP was going to represent the left in the country during the late
1980’s election cycles. In 1986, they won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy
positions in different assemblies, 9 congressional seats, 6 senators seats, and
4.6% of the presidential vote.98 These results were greater than any other leftist
party in Colombia, and more than any other third party in its history. The UP
wanted to represent the hopes of the people and the needs of the poor. These
desires were also synonymous with those of the FARC, which was why it was so
fitting that the FARC co-founded the organization. The UP’s goals were to fight
for land redistribution, better health care, educational improvements for the
poor, and the nationalization of businesses, banks and transportation99. These
desires to represent the people however were never offered to the UP as the Uribe
administration never followed through on its promises to help protect the party’s
leaders from governmental sponsored paramilitary groups.100
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Key LatinoBarómetro Data for Colombian Democracy:
Democracy in Colombia has been severally affected by the actions of the
federal government against the FARC and the UP. The lack of democratic
legitimacy within the Colombian government as well as the lack of variety in
politcal parties is due in most part to state sponsored violence committed against
the UP. The current state of democracy in Colombia is in shambles. The
Colombian general populace has generally lost faith in the system, and the
following LatinoBarómetro data helps prove this claim.
In a 2013 poll 34.5% of the populace surveyed said that they wouldn’t vote
while another 6.4% said that they would submit blank ballots. In addition to this
data the overall satisfaction with democracy in 2013 was staggeringly low. In the
LatinoBarómetro poll of satisfaction only 4.1% of those polled responded as
saying that they are happy with the state of democracy. Currently some 49.35% of
those polled they are not very satisfied with the democratic institution in place.
Additionally, only around some 1.5% of the population believe that there is a
democratic process in place with some 48.6% saying that the government is
currently a democracy but that it has major problems. Another interesting piece
of data that LatinoBarómetro provides regarding current beliefs about democracy
in Colombia are the polls endorsing a one party system. In the 2013 polls for
Colombia of those interviewed who don’t feel that the one party system is the
most effective approach to governance. Only 25.1% agree or strongly agree with
the idea of a one party system while the other 74.9% of those polled believe that
there should be a multiple party system in place.
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These two data sets support the case for the inclusion of the FARC in the
political structure go back to 1985. The people of Colombia clearly feel that the
democratic system is not working and that the parties that are in place aren’t
representing their needs as a society. The FARC, in their recent round of
negotiations with the Colombian state have asked for something similar to
Uruguay, when the Tupamaros became a political party. In their negotiations
with the Colombian government they sought to bring about a self-critique to try
and reform the state model. In 2013, Colombia Reports published a piece in 2013
regarding the response of one of the leaders of the FARC to a political controversy
regarding corruption in the armed forces. The current leader, Timoleon Jiménez,
directly addressed the letter to the current Colombian president Juan Manuel
Santos saying the following,
Se puede leer en las noticias. El modelo de imposiciones e
intolerancias se ha agotado. La democracia colombiana, por encima
de los discursos, es una vergüenza, Santos. Vamos a cambiarla.101
Roughly translated Jiménez is saying that one can see in the news that the
government is exhausted and that it is shame. I think that the idea of a complete
reform of the government is a valid one. When examining the effect of the
organizational review that the Tupamaros underwent, and their subsequent
success, this review could be of use for Colombia. The commitment to an internal
review would lead to very positive democratic results in Colombia and possibly
resolve the issues currently facing democracy within the country.

"Timochenko le envió carta al presidente Santos rechazando la democracia
colombiana” Colombiano July 9th, 2013
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Colombia’s Conflict and Peace Process:
The war between the FARC and the government has claimed around
220,000 lives and 6.7 million people have been labeled as victims of the war
between the government, paramilitaries, and the guerillas.102 The reform of the
UP and the ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC
are reassuring for the future. The negotiations began in 2013 and a the
LatinoBarómetro survey regarding people’s belief’s for democracy in ten years
showed a remarkable increase as previously described.
The general sense of all those in Colombia is that the future for the country
still lies with democratization. This claim is supported by a LatinoBarómetro
survey where 52.3% of Colombian’s believe that democracy is the preferable
system of governance. In this poll, only 12.7% said that they would prefer an
authoritative form of governance to democracy. LatinoBarómetro also has
surveys that show that the people believe that the future for democracy is bright.
The current polls reflecting the scale of democratization of Colombia show that
only 10.1% of Colombians feel that the government is completely democratic.
LatinoBarómetro also takes polls for where the people think that democracy is
going to be in ten years from now and the results from the 2013 survey were
interesting. Some 63.4% of those polled believe that in 10 years the state will be
completely democratic with only 1.4% believing that the state will be
undemocratic. This data is encouraging as recent news described the UP party as
attempting to return to the political arena in Colombia. They also refuse to call
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themselves communists or Marxists but seek to gain the trust of millions of
impoverished people on the fringes of the country.103
The relationship that has developed between the FARC and the political
institutions of the Colombia government is extensive historically speaking. With
these negotiations underway, the process trying to stabilize Colombia can begin.
As such it is important to note that the FARC, through the UP, began as an
organization that sought political change through peaceful means. The
government used this to its advantage and invited them into the political process,
just to slaughter their candidates. This politicide was a negative turning point
that led to genocide. Colombia is now ready to move on past this period of
violence to reform their political process. The current negotiations between the
FARC and the Santos government are healthy and should lead to a positive
change in the overall democratic transition of Colombian politics.
The current negotiations currently with the FARC are still progressing and
are promising. They have reached several stalling points but they are seeking to
try and reach a point where the two can agree on issues as wide and varying as
land reform, governmental reform, drug trafficking, etc.104 The war that has been
waged between the government and the FARC is one that needs to end in order
for democracy to flourish in Colombia. If the two sides can reach an agreement
like that of the MLN-T and the Uruguayan government then the outcome would
be very productive for both sides.
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Conclusion:
The UP party that the FARC co-sponsored is now fighting for it’s very
survival. How can we justify or explain this outcome for each guerilla movement?
In Racheal Rudolph’s From Terrorism to Politics, she says
These murders radicalized FARC, which felt legitimized in its
actions: FARC officially interpreted the UP’s extermination as a
sign of the government’s intolerance and of the impossibility of
legal political action in Colombia. A serious chance, such as that
witnessed in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, was therefore lost.105
The FARC began, as an organization that sought democratic reconciliation
through a political participation in Colombia but the Uribe organization didn’t
accept that they were an honest player. The previous quote is particularly
interesting because it reveals the frustration of not being able to reach a peaceful
agreement as what occurred in Ireland with the IRA and in Lebanon with
Hezbollah.106 While the other examples here, in both Lebanon and Ireland had
didn’t partake in the narcotrafficking, the political frustrations regarding
representation are similar.
The resulting ceasefire merely forced the FARC to prolong its battle
against the government and becoming even more violent. In the
LatinoBarómetro surveys the percentage of people who say that guerilla
movements are a crucial issue, these polls are very high but they have gone down
significantly over the last decade. From 2001-2003 for example the number of
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people that said the guerillas and their armed insurrection were the major issues
facing the country was high 40.5%. Whereas in 2008 that number dropped
significantly to 16.6% and in 2013 it was down to 12.4%.
The violence experienced in the aftermath of the failed integration of the
FARC-UP coalition was extensive and devastating. As was previously mentioned
Colombia is a country where political development is in a state of disarray and
one of the major issues that they are contending with is guerilla and paramilitary
violence. If one relies on the surveys taken by third parties, like LatinoBarómetro,
using methods described by Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbel Pérez
Liñán then several key aspects are going to be missing. In their own words they
define democracy as,
We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair
competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that
allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties
and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really
govern and the military is under civilian control.107
These categories are useful when examining countries with established and
secure democracies, but when evaluating a situation like Colombia they are not
adequate. This is not to say that democracy is non-existent in Colombia, but
rather that there are discrepancies within the strength of democracy being high.
The system is in disarray because democratic values do not extend past the major
cities where the federal government can oversee the democratic process. The
government of Colombia must seek to extend the parameters of democracy past
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the major metropolises and into the countryside. The issue that has violently
erupted looks to develop democracy, involves the war that the government and
the FARC are waging that puts all citizens in serious danger.
The issue of controlling the FARC, Colombian government, and
paramilitary violence through the ongoing war that the government is waging is
of the utmost importance to spread democratization across Colombia. In order to
try and negotiate with the FARC, the Santos administration is having to deal with
the outcome of forcing more guerilla warfare. They are effectively demobilizing
an army, and trying to reintegrate them back into society. The current
negotiations are hitting several reported “road-blocks” including narcotrafficking,
land-redistribution, and political representation or a political change of some
kind. These negotiations are crucial for the advancement of democracy in
Colombia and will allow for the country to constructively on raising the quality of
institutions while maximizing the effectiveness of the participatory process.
If Colombia had allowed the FARC to take an active role in the democratic
structure of the country, then the shape of democracy today might be completely
different. The exclusiveness of the Colombian political system is one of the major
reasons for the continued violence within the nation. If the political system was
allowed to be open, like that of Uruguay, then the FARC would not need to
continue guerilla warfare. The most significant aspect related to this is that the
negotiations between the government and the FARC haven’t broken down yet
and the peace progress is continuing. The inclusion of the FARC and other
movements is crucial to developing a healthy democracy.
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Chapter Four: El Salvador’s FMLN
History of the FMLN:
The formation of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN),
which was formally announced on October 10th, 1980, was the result of a long
process of negotiations that were held in Cuba between different leftist groups from
El Salvador. The five groups, which included the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación
Farabundo Martí (FPL), The People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), The Resistencia
Nacional (RN), The Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (PCS), and the Partido
Revolucionario de los Trbajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).108 The negotiations
held in Cuba tried to sort out the political differences these groups attempted to iron
throughout the 1970’s during their development. The political differences, which
included conflicts over guerilla strategies as well as competing political interests,
the most important involving peasant support in El Salvador, had to be resolved
before the FMLN could be formed into a viable political party.109
The guerilla movement in El Salvador began in the 1970’s as an offshoot of
the Communist part. During this it was divided over the issue of what approach
would reap the most success; 1) armed insurgency or 2) engage El Salvador’s
political system. The dissenting voices within the movement however sought to
enter negotiations following the Sandinistas defeat of the Anastacio Somoza
MacClintock, Cynthia. Revolutionary movements in Latin America: El Salvador's
FMLN Peru's Shining Path. Washington (D.C.): United States Institute of Peace Press,
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dictatorship in Nicaragua. The strength of the Sandinistas came through the
unification of various dissenting guerilla movements into one organized front
against the Somoza dictatorship.110 The triumph of Sandinistas in Nicaragua
inspired a great deal of fear within the government of El Salvador, and encouraged
them to fully endorse a violent policy to destroy political resistance.111
The violence that the guerilla groups endured led to the FMLN conference
held in Havana, Cuba, for an accord amongst the larger guerilla groups fighting in El
Salvador. The accomplishment of these negotiations allowed the FMLN to release a
statement regarding the objectives of the movement and what they were fighting
for. The FMLN and their leaders were fighting against the government to create a
social democracy in El Salvador and to contest the authoritarian regime.112 Joaquín
Villalobos, one of the main leaders of the FMLN, explains their position,
The FMLN is struggling for a government of full participation, with
representation from all the democratic political forces, including of
course the FMLN-FDR…. The FMLN maintains that a government of
full participation should guarantee freedom of expression and
organization, respect for Human Rights, and truly free elections with
participation by all parties and forces113.
The FMLN merely sought democratic stability and a government that reflected the
demands of the people. The government however felt that the group was seeking to
enforce a Marxist-Leninist ideology for the nation.
With this in mind, the FMLN leadership sought to persuade the El Salvadoran
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middle class that the group was not seeking to create a socialist state in El Salvador,
but only sought to change the political reality of the country. Another leader of the
FMLN, Cayetano Carpio, who was leader of the FPL until 1983, was perceived to be
one of the movements most profound Marxists-Leninists, who described the group’s
efforts,
The revolutionary government… will not be socialist…. The
revolutionary democratic government will support all private
businessmen, the small industrialists and merchants, and all of those
who promote the development of the country and the application of a
revolutionary democratic program.114
The FMLN wanted to overhaul the government and follow in the footsteps of the
Cuban Revolution. This effort, which had the prime opportunity to realize the
ambitions of leading the country from a revolutionary platform failed to capitalize
on the moment due to the continuation of infighting within the FMLN after the
negotiations ended.
This failure to grasp the opportunity of a weakened government materialized
through the poorly organized “Final Offensive” in 1981, which was meant to be a
broad sweeping movement against the national military. The FMLN proposed plan
was a multi-faceted assault on two-thirds of El Salvador’s military garrisons. The
timing was ideal for the group because General Carlos Romero was in a very
unstable political position and lacked the support of wealthy local elites and the U.S.
The eventual failure of the “Final Offensive” was due to dissent amongst the five
groups that made up the FMLN coalition, specifically the RN and ERP, who refused
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to commit to the action.115 The failure of the “Final Offensive” would setback the
FMLN a decade before they saw their efforts materialize into political
representation. Efforts to end authoritarianism became much more complicated
following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the renewed commitment to
anti-communist intervention as a policy in Central America.
U.S. Involvement in El Salvador:
Throughout Latin America, especially during the 20th century, the influence
of the U.S. government can unmistakably be seen. El Salvador was no exception as
increased support to the military regime was synonymous with the rise of the FMLN
in El Salvador. These interactions were most noticeable in the realm of financial and
military assistance by the U.S. government. In 1979, the U.S. gave El Salvador 11
million dollars of financial support, by 1980 this jumped to 64 million dollars. From
1980 onwards the amount of financial support that the U.S. provided to El Salvador
continued to rise, and in 1987 the total rose to 574 millions dollars worth of
support. The increased assistance can be placed in perspective by examining the
percentage of support El Salvador received, in comparison with other Latin
American nations. As was previously noted the U.S. hit its aid peak in 1987, at 574
million dollars, this level of support represented 30% of the total U.S. aid to Latin
America, which is impressive seeing as El Salvador only has 5 million citizens.116
The type of aid that the U.S. provided is important to understand when
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examining the FMLN as the majority of the aid was used to develop the El
Salvadoran military. From 1980 to 1989 the U.S. provided El Salvador around $1
billion in financial support for their military. Specifically, in 1984, the highest year of
aid during this period, the U.S. provided 194 million dollars for military support,
representing more than half of the U.S. total military aid in Latin America. This
information is relevant because, when examining the size of the armed forces in
comparison to the FMLN, in 1979 the ratio was 1.5 military officials to every guerilla
fighter. This ratio would rise by the end of the 1980’s to a ratio of 8 soldiers to 1
guerilla.117
This military aid was designed to help the regime in its efforts to end the
FMLN and their terrorist activities throughout El Salvador. The aid provided the U.S.
an opportunity to apply pressure to the El Salvadoran government regarding their
elections system and human rights violations. The U.S., while being afraid of the rise
of the communism throughout Latin America, were also concerned about the use of
their aid for the support of death squads. The U.S. became heavily involved in El
Salvadoran politics, making it very clear to government officials that should human
rights violations continue to occur U.S. aid would dramatically decline. This
realization motivated the government to support candidates that the U.S. backed as
a positive example of U.S. aid to El Salvador.118
The U.S. believed the success of the elections in El Salvador, in 1982, was a
positive sign that the country was moving towards a superficial democratic process
117
118

MacClintock, Revolutionary movements in Latin America, 228-229.
MacClintock, Revolutionary movements in Latin America, 225.
52

and that the FMLN lacked popular support against the government. Even with this
attempted transition to the Presidency of Álvaro Magaña, human rights violations
persisted and the FMLN continued to grow in strength. As continuing political strife
led to the U.S. Congress to severally curtail the military aid that President Reagan
provided to El Salvador. In the election of 1984, President Reagan and Vice
President George H.W. Bush made it apparent to El Salvadoran politicians that
human rights and democratization had to improve for the U.S. to continue to
provide resources to combat the FMLN. The 1984 election marked a great success as
the election was perceived as successful and clean, and José Duarte, who was the
U.S.’s favorite candidate, won the election.119
Duarte’s administration however faced great difficulties in combating the
FMLN, while attempting to spread democratic ideals to the El Salvadoran people.
Moreover, people desired social reforms, but Duarte’s U.S. backed free market
policies made the development of effective social reforms extremely difficult.
Duarte, who won as a candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, received 1-3
million dollars in covert funds from the CIA in 1984.120 The equivalent per capita to
50-100 million for a U.S. election and lost the respect from the El Salvadoran people.
In the elections of 1989, Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party lost the
presidency to ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista). With the victory of
ARENA’s Alfredo Cristiani, and of George H.W. Bush in 1989, policy regarding the
FMLN dramatically changed as political violence increased. Throughout El Salvador
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changes in this strategy reflected a desire by both the U.S. and El Salvador to seek a
negotiated settlement with the FMLN rather than use military force to defeat the
guerillas.121
The Peace Process and Integration of the FMLN:
The war between the FMLN and the government came to a head in 1989
when the guerillas launched a final offensive against the U.S. backed military regime.
After a failed series of negotiations with the recently President-elect Alfredo
Cristiani following a death squad attack on the Federación Nacional Sindical de
Trabajadores, the largest labor trade federation in El Salvador, the FMLN reverted to
a full on assault. This approach, was swift with a series of conflicts between the
guerillas and government’s forces, which only served to show that the government
wasn’t capable of defeating the guerillas in combat. This level of political violence,
which the conflict had generated, led to an international intervention, where the
U.N. Security Council and President George H.W. Bush’s administration called for
peace between the guerillas and the government.122
The FMLN offensive launched during that year would effectively halt the
counterterrorism efforts of the government. With the support of the international
community and the impressive manner with which the FMLN had combatted the
government gave them a serious advantage during peace negotiations in 1990. The
conditions for peace the FMLN presented to the government involved reforming the
security sector, ending impunity, and major political reforms. While the negotiations
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failed to provide extensive military reforms, the amnesty reforms they won were
later overturned by ARENA in 1993. The FMLN however did get many of the
political reforms they had sought. On January 16th 1992 the FMLN and President
Cristiani signed a peace accord at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City.123
The outcome of these negotiations was that the FMLN went from being a
potent armed political movement to a major political actor in the new El Salvadoran
neoliberal democracy. This peace process was made difficult as both the FMLN and
the government violated the agreed upon peace accords. The FMLN, which agreed to
hand in all their weapons, remained armed by storing caches of weapons in
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras. Most notably, in Nicaragua one exploded
prompting the surrendering of several caches in different countries. Like the FMLN,
the Cristiani government also struggled to comply with the agreements of the peace
accords. The failure of the peace process took the form of state agents and right
wing extremists engaging in the assassinations of FMLN leaders and social activists
at the same time maintaining paramilitary death squads by merely changing their
names.124
After settling the peace accord violations, the FMLN finally demobilized its
guerilla force and formally entered into El Salvador’s political process. With this in
mind the, FMLN sought to have a political apparatus in place to support the party’s
participation in the presidential, municipal, and parliamentary elections of 1994. In
order for the movement to be able to achieve this level of political sophistication
they trained their members in activities related to political activism and electoral
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politics. With this transition came new difficulties, in 1994 when the FMLN formally
dissolved the five different parties making up the guerilla coalition all differed in the
political direction with the FMLN movement. These differences initially took the
form of the PD, which was made up of the RN and the ERP, which would eventually
develop into an internal political conflict for the left of El Salvador.125
FMLN’s Political Successes and Difficulties:
The dissention of the movement and departure of the ERP and RN from the
FMLN in 1994 was the result of decision to change to a 9 out of 15 majority for the
party’s decision-making process. The development of a 60 percent threshold led to
the ERP and RN being effectively phased out by the FPL, FAL, and PRTC during the
presidential primary for the 1994 election. During these elections, the FMLN
candidate, Rubén Zamora, would lose to ARENA’s Armando Calderón Sol in a close
runoff. In addition to this loss at the presidential level, the FMLN accrued 21 of the
available 84 seats in the National assembly, making it the second largest party to
ARENA, but not affirming their strength as a political movement.126
Following a restructuring of the movement, by making it easier for the
political party to allow people to join the FMLN and not have to seek individual
groups to try and seek entry into the party. This reconstruction helped solidify the
FMLN as one heterogeneous political party and allowed them to experience more
success during the following election cycle in 1997. This election cycle, which was
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the first one where the PD was an active competitor to the FMLN, marked an
increase in political representation for the FMLN. Who saw an increased in number
of National Assembly seats from 21 to 27, and a 15-35 increase in mayors, gaining
political control of capital of San Salvador.127
These advances marked the FMLN successfully surviving the defection of the
ERP and the RN from their party, as the PD only managed to attain 1 percent of the
popular vote for their candidates in 1997. Differences within the party continued
with the presidential election of 1999, where the FMLN struggled to select a
presidential candidate. After much internal debate, they decided on Facundo
Guardado and Nidia Díaz as the vice president for their presidential ticket. This led
to an unsuccessful FMLN primary, as they only captured 30 percent of the popular
vote and lost once again to the ARENA candidate Francisco Flores.128
Following this defeat the party, it was still able to increase its presence in the
legislative and municipal elections of 2000, overcoming ARENA in the National
assembly for a total of 31 to 29 seats in the national assembly. This victory marked
the first time since 1989 that ARENA had not held the majority of seats in the
national assembly. The following elections of 2002-2003 the FMLN also achieved
great success maintaining their lead against ARENA in the legislative bloc by
significantly overtaking them in opinion polls for the presidential election in 2004.
However, following the legislative election cycle the FMLN once again faced great
internal strife and the selection of a presidential candidate divided the entire
127
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movement. The candidate that the FMLN put forward for the 2004 presidential
election was Schafik Handal, who was well received by the majority of FMLN
members, but faced stiff disapproval from the general public. Handal was perceived
as a member of the old generation of the FMLN. As the ARENA candidate, Elías
Antonio Saca, represented a new and more modern approach to leadership with a
more constructive image. Saca’s desires to improve their relations and outreach to
the population won ARENA the election, with Handal only receiving 36 percent of
the vote.129
This defeat forced the FMLN to create a unified vision for their political party.
This agreed upon position, from which they would seek to communicate their
desires for the country, was a Marxist-Leninist platform. This cohesion did not
reflect well in the 2006 election period, where they did not make much political
head way, but the united vision of the party would assist them in future. The most
important of which would become the Presidential election of 2009.130
On September 11, 2007, the FMLN announced that their presidential ticket
would include Mauricio Funes running for president and Sánchez Cerén as his vice
president candidate. The selection of Funes was important to success of the 2009
campaign, due to his ability to gain more centrist votes for the FMLN. Funes was a
journalist and not a member of the FMLN, but had expressed great interest in
running with the FMLN party since 2004. With the death of Handal in 2006 while
returning from Evo Morales’s inauguration, and the political unification of the
129
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socialist left of the FMLN Funes was the ideal candidate for the party. In the 2009
election Funes, with the FMLN support and centrist voters, won the presidential
election against ARENA’s Rodrigo Avila by a few points, 51.3 to 48.7.131
This election marked the first time that a candidate from the FMLN had been
elected to the presidency, but with it came a difficult period for the direction of the
party. During the presidency of Funes there was a disagreement between the FMLN
and Funes over their respective domestic policies and Funes’s efforts to build his
own image as a leader. Funes operated in an independent nature because in El
Salvador there is a constitutional law in place that doesn’t allow candidates to run
twice in a row for presidency through the same group.132 This law led the FMLN to
select a different candidate for the 2014 presidential election, the former Vice
President, Sánchez Cerén.
Cerén’s candidacy for the FMLN signaled a return of the guerilla presence
because of his status as a commander in the FMLN’s guerilla movement during the
revolution. Cerén however sought to appease concerns that he would seek to
replicate Húgo Chávez populist policies, by affirming that he wanted to position
himself more to the center and to replicate José Mujica of Uruguay. The 2014
presidential election between Cerén and the conservative Norman Quijano was a
tightly contested race with Cerén narrowly winning. He won with a little over 6,000
votes and his election led to many accusations of political corruption, which led
ARENA to initiate several legal cases to contest his election. The result was that
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Cerén won the election, but the aftermath of the close race caused the public to
doubt the legitimacy of democracy, leaving a scar on the electoral process in El
Salvador.133
Data examining the reception of Democracy in El Salvador:
When examining data for El Salvador, recorded by LatinoBarómetro, there
are several different points that stand out as interesting regarding the FMLN, and
democracy in El Salvador. The first is the data surrounding citizen’s political
allegiances to different individual parties. The poll asked if you had to vote this
Sunday for a political party, who would you support. In 1996, which was when the
FMLN was allowed to form as a political party, only 7.4% of those polled said the
FMLN would have their support, while 19.9% said ARENA. This data was to be
expected, but the highest group, 28.9%, were those who said that they would not
vote at all, which is interesting when viewing the growth of the FMLN.
In addition to this voter information, LatinoBarómetro also polled citizens
regarding their perception of politics in the country during 1996. The top three
beliefs, which cumulatively equaled 61.8% of the total population sample, were
indifference, distrust and boredom, in that order. The data would continue to reflect
this belief in the 2002-2003 elections with the combined total of the FMLN and
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ARENA equating to 36.6% and those not voting equaling 34.9%. These data points
are particularly interesting because they indicate that the voter population still
didn’t feel represented by either political party. These trends however would take
on a different form in the presidential elections of 2009. This cycle, as was noted
previously, was the first time a FMLN candidate was elected to become the
president of the country.
The data trends from polls done by LatinoBarómetro in 2009 represented a
positive transition for democracy within El Salvador. One such poll, in response to a
question regarding the power of the individual’s vote, and the change it can cause,
showed that 76.4% felt their vote mattered, while 19.6% felt that their vote didn’t.
This poll marked a dramatic improvement to the same poll taken in 1996, at the
beginning of the FMLN participating in El Salvador’s political system, where 45.6%
of the sample felt that their vote held no significance for the future. Additionally, the
overall satisfaction with democracy increased from 1996 to 2009. In 1996 40.6%
felt unsatisfied with democracy, and 26.8% were not satisfied at all. These numbers
were greatly reduced in the 2009 poll, with 42.3% claiming to be satisfied and
17.8% being very satisfied, and only 26% felt unsatisfied and 10.1% felt very
unsatisfied.
In addition to these political improvements in the perception of El Salvador
becoming a democracy during the rise of the FMLN, was the changing perception
regarding the rigging of elections. When LatinoBarómetro polled El Salvador in
1997 a resounding 54.2% of those polled felt that the elections at the time were
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rigged, while only 36.9% felt they were clean. These data points would look vastly
different when the same poll was asked in 2009. The result of that poll was how
62.3% of voters felt that the elections were clean and only 25.4% of those asked in
the poll felt that the elections system was rigged. These polls show that
democratization in El Salvador, which included the FMLN, was moving in a positive
direction. A positive direction that would face a serious challenge in the most recent
2015 polls regarding the development of democratic institutions.
While the data from 1996-2009 showed an upward trajectory for democracy,
the data following the election of 2014, and the controversy that surrounded the
results, reversed the progress that had been made with the Salvadoran voters. The
data regarding the most recent presidential race show that 39.6% of the sample felt
it was fraudulent and 10.9% thought it was very fraudulent. This data can be used to
understand other polls regarding democracy, and how support and satisfaction for
democracy were recorded at their lowest points since 2007. With these points being
acknowledged not all the data for democratic trends in El Salvador are negative.
The polls regarding support for a democratic system of government were
still positive, with 48.8% believing that it was the best and 11.5% inclining strongly
that it is the best system for governance. In addition, when polled about the impact
that they felt their vote could provide the feedback was positive. The result was that
54.1% of those polled felt that their vote would influence the future, and the
structure of the government, with 37.9% saying that they didn’t feel their vote
would secure any change in government. These two trends represent positive
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perspectives on democracy in El Salvador today, and for the democratic structure
moving forward.
Conclusion:
The overall efforts of FMLN, like those of the MLN-T in Uruguay, have created
a positive environment for democracy in El Salvador, and improving political
participation in the democratic process has been crucial to this development. The
FMLN’s efforts since they initially broke from the communist party in the 1970’s to
take up arms against the failing El Salvadoran government have been crucial to the
evolution of democracy. The FMLN resisted not only the military regime, but also
against the financial aid and support provided by the U.S. throughout the conflict.
The FMLN fought against these forces to secure a position in the government that
meant something and could provide meaningful change.
Upon securing a peace agreement in 1992, which saw their vision realized,
they began the process of integrating themselves into the democratic structure of El
Salvador. In 1994, the FMLN would put together its first candidates in the elections
for local seats throughout the country. The FMLN then began experiencing success
during these and subsequent elections throughout the following ten years. Building
off these electoral successes the FMLN launched a successful presidential campaign
in 2009 with Mauricio Funes. The FMLN would follow this success with the election
of Sánchez Cerén, in the 2014 presidential election, who holds office currently .
When examining the political environment of El Salvador it is impossible to
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ignore the impact of the FMLN. It was a guerilla movement that went from being an
anti-systemic movement by taking up arms against political corruption, to becoming
an active party within democracy seeking to alter the government. Through their
efforts, they saw their political ambitions realized and changed the system to allow
their beliefs to be represented in El Salvador. The FMLN provided legitimacy to
democratization in El Salvador and signaled the transition from authoritarian
politics to multi-party democracy. The future of El Salvador, and the soundness of
the government’s institutions, is now being guided not only by ARENA and El
Salvadorian politician’s but also by the FMLN guerillas who once fought for this
form or representative democracy.
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Epilogue
Guerilla movements throughout Latin America have waged war for different
reasons and in widely varying situations. In this paper I have evaluated three
different guerilla movements the FARC, MLN-T, and the FMLN. These three groups
were selected because, unlike other groups throughout Latin American history, they
sought to transition into politics, rather than transform them entirely. Unlike the
successful revolutionary movements of Cuba and Nicaragua, and the unsuccessful
efforts of other groups, they didn’t seek to take over the governmental systems they
were opposing. These guerillas rather sought to become members of the political
institutions and, through their armed resistance, to gain entry to the political
institutions of their respective countries.
When examining these groups, it is helpful to gain some understanding of
guerilla warfare in a global sense, and how other movements have been
international viewed. To compare with the groups examined in this paper, the
Umkhonto we Sizwe (RK), which was the militant branch of the African National
Congress (ANC) in South Africa was an international movement that resorted to
violence to attain their goals. Like the movements that have been described in the
paper, the ANC, a political organization, sought to be a part of the government that
had no desire to include them in the system. In the 1960’s the ANC created the RK
branch of their movement, which would assume the military operations. Through
the efforts of the ANC, the RK, and international support, the ANC was able to
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participate in the South African political system.134 The ANC and the RK are an
example of movements that used the violence that has become associated with
guerilla movements of Latin America to attain political representation. Like the RK
the three movements described in this paper were movements that used armed
insurgency as a way of attaining political representation within their own countries.
The Tupamaros, an urban guerilla movement that sought to oppose an
undemocratic and brutal dictatorship in Uruguay, were unable to achieve military
success or an immediate negotiated participation. The Tupamaros, and those who
sought democratization in Uruguay, eventually defeated the dictatorship, and
achieved their goal of joining the political system. The guerilla’s participation would
have to wait until democracy was restored in Uruguay, but the MLN-T party would
eventually attain political support and would formally enter as the FA coalition.
Their participation would see José Mujica, a former MLN-T guerilla leader who was
tortured by the dictatorship surviving to become the president of the country. The
guerillas efforts would lead a political coalition of parties through which they were
able to exert direct influence over the government, and extend access to all the
politically marginalized in Uruguay. The success of the movement, and the
development of guerilla leaders shows the ability of non-state actors to transition
and become formal actors within the government.
As was the case with Uruguay, El Salvador was a country that was rife with
political malpractice, and the FMLN moved to armed resistance to attain a
Lissoni, Arianna . "Transformations in the ANC External Mission and Umkhonto
We Sizwe, C. 1960-1969." Journal of Southern African Studies
134
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resolution to address the military regime. This rebellion, which resembled the
movement in South Africa in that the FMLN had a political and militant branch,
quickly decided to follow armed insurrection to achieve their political goals. After a
long and bloody civil war, the FMLN and the El Salvadoran government reached an
agreement that saw the FMLN gain political representation. The success of the
movement, and their ability to transition from a violent actor to a political actor,
shows the ability of the Tupamaros to become formal political actors.
This idea of political involvement of non-state armed actors has not been the
case with the FARC and Colombia. The ideals that the FARC began with, to combat a
corrupt governmental structure and to seek to enact change did not last for the
duration of the movement. When the group was allowed to form the UP political
party, their involvement in the government was a complete failure. This resulted in
a return to armed resistance to combat the corruption that had barred them from
political participation. Following this break down in direct political involvement the
group diverged from their initial beliefs and have only recently begun renegotiating
with the government to seek peaceful reentry into society. Part of their negotiations,
includes, in a similar pattern to the other two groups discussed, political
representation within the government and the ability to form a political party.
Guerilla groups, like the three that this paper has discussed, are militant
groups that are fighting for a political objective. Whether these objectives are
ideological or if the groups are fighting to attain political rights, they nonetheless
use violent resistance as a way of attaining their goals. In my paper, I have shown
that guerilla movements, while they began as informal and militant movements, can
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integrate and become positive formal parties within democratic structures. The
FMLN, MLN-T, and the FARC’s UP are all examples describing the extent to which
guerillas can integrate and become members of formal, stable, and representative
democracies.
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